Optimal jamming attacks and network defense policies in wireless sensor networks
Ημερομηνία
2007Λέξη-κλειδί
Επιτομή
We consider a scenario where a sophisticated jammer jams an area in a single-channel wireless sensor network. The jammer controls the probability of jamming and transmission range to cause maximal damage to the network in terms of corrupted communication links. The jammer action ceases when it is detected by a monitoring node in the network, and a notification message is transferred out of the jamming region. The jammer is detected at a monitor node by employing an optimal detection test based on the percentage of incurred collisions. On the other hand, the network computes channel access probability in an effort to minimize the jamming detection plus notification time. In order for the jammer to optimize its benefit, it needs to know the network channel access probability and number of neighbors of the monitor node. Accordingly, the network needs to know the jamming probability of the jammer. We study the idealized case of perfect knowledge by both the jammer and the network about the strategy of one another, and the case where the jammer or the network lack this knowledge. The latter is captured by formulating and solving optimization problems, the solutions of which constitute best responses of the attacker or the network to the worst-case strategy of each other. We also take into account potential energy constraints of the jammer and the network. We extend the problem to the case of multiple observers and adaptable jamming transmission range and propose a intuitive heuristic jamming strategy for that case. © 2007 IEEE.