dc.creator | Stavropoulos D., Miliotis V., Korakis T., Tassiulas L. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-01-31T10:02:47Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-01-31T10:02:47Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.identifier | 10.1109/NOMS47738.2020.9110385 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9781728149738 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11615/79416 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we examine the problem of the efficient allocation of resources in networking testbeds, which cannot be shared among the experimenters. We highlight the similarities with the housing market where indivisible network resources play the role of houses, while experimenters the role of owners. We adopt the Top-Trading-Cycles (TTC) algorithm for providing Pareto efficient allocations and we compare this approach with the current mechanism of the simple First-Come-First-Served (FCFS) approach used in most networking testbeds. A formulation of the problem is provided where we describe the average utility of the system as a function of the desired testbed resources of the experimenters and the final allocation of the resources to them. In the performance evaluation we observe that TTC outperforms FCFS in all the examined scenarios and achieves almost 95% better average utility in certain cases. © 2020 IEEE. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.source | Proceedings of IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium 2020: Management in the Age of Softwarization and Artificial Intelligence, NOMS 2020 | en |
dc.source.uri | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85086758197&doi=10.1109%2fNOMS47738.2020.9110385&partnerID=40&md5=7a0d86e6594f3aca314d480244abd231 | |
dc.subject | Commerce | en |
dc.subject | Pareto principle | en |
dc.subject | Average utilities | en |
dc.subject | Current mechanisms | en |
dc.subject | Efficient allocations | en |
dc.subject | First come first served | en |
dc.subject | Matching theory | en |
dc.subject | Network resource | en |
dc.subject | Pareto-efficient | en |
dc.subject | Top trading cycle | en |
dc.subject | Testbeds | en |
dc.subject | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. | en |
dc.title | Matching Theory Application for Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Testbed Resources | en |
dc.type | conferenceItem | en |