Bargaining-based mobile data offloading
dc.creator | Gao, L. | en |
dc.creator | Iosifidis, G. | en |
dc.creator | Huang, J. | en |
dc.creator | Tassiulas, L. | en |
dc.creator | Li, D. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-11-23T10:26:57Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-11-23T10:26:57Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.identifier | 10.1109/JSAC.2014.2328393 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 7338716 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11615/27650 | |
dc.description.abstract | The unprecedented growth of mobile data traffic challenges the performance and economic viability of today's cellular networks and calls for novel network architectures and communication solutions. Data offloading through third-party WiFi or femtocell access points (APs) can effectively alleviate the cellular network congestion in low operational and capital expenditure. This solution requires the cooperation and agreement of mobile cellular network operators (MNOs) and AP owners (APOs). In this paper, we model and analyze the interaction among one MNO and multiple APOs (for the amount of MNO's offloading data and the respective APOs' compensations) by using thew Nash bargaining theory. Specifically, we introduce a one-to-many bargaining game among the MNO and APOs and analyze the bargaining solution (game equilibrium) systematically under two different bargaining protocols: 1) sequential bargaining, where the MNO bargains with APOs sequentially, with one APO at a time, in a given order; and 2) concurrent bargaining, where the MNO bargains with all APOs concurrently. We quantify the benefits for APOs when bargaining sequentially and earlier with the MNO, and the losses for APOs when bargaining concurrently with the MNO. We further study the group bargaining scenario where multiple APOs form a group bargaining with the MNO jointly and quantify the benefits for APOs when forming such a group. Interestingly, our analysis indicates that grouping of APOs not only benefits the APOs in the group but may also benefit some APOs not in the group. Our results shed light on the economic aspects and the possible outcomes of the MNO/APOs interactions and can be used as a roadmap for designing policies for this promising data offloading solution. © 2014 IEEE. | en |
dc.source | IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications | en |
dc.source.uri | http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84905028968&partnerID=40&md5=4702a4eff5a0b064c9f425b132100c74 | |
dc.subject | group bargaining | en |
dc.subject | Mobile data offloading | en |
dc.subject | Nash bargaining solution | en |
dc.subject | Mobile telecommunication systems | en |
dc.subject | Network architecture | en |
dc.subject | Capital expenditures | en |
dc.subject | Communication solutions | en |
dc.subject | Mobile cellular networks | en |
dc.subject | Mobile data traffic | en |
dc.subject | Nash bargaining theories | en |
dc.subject | Wi-Fi | en |
dc.title | Bargaining-based mobile data offloading | en |
dc.type | journalArticle | en |
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