ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to study the prospects of Cross-border Cooperation (CBC) between Greece and Turkey, with respect to historical, religious, linguistic and cultural differences which distinguishes each population. CBC is a key priority of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. It aims to reinforce co-operation between member states and partner countries along the external border of the European Union. CBC promotes economic and social development in border areas, it addresses common challenges, ensuring efficient and secure borders and promoting people-to-people cooperation. The accession of Turkey in the European Union and the upcoming enlargements are considered of vital importance for the future of the European Union. Turkey is a country with internal differentiations and one of the central reflections is if Turkey can adapt its structures and institutions to the requirements of Europe regarding, the harmonization with fundamental principles and values that maintain the European Union. Finally, it is important to make a brief reference to the relations among Turkey and the member states of the EU. Furthermore it presents the role of Islam in Turkey's accession prospects, and the phenomenon of cross-border co-operation between Greece and Turkey.

Key words: Border, cooperation, Greece, Turkey, cross border
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ACRONYMS

CBC: Cross Border Co-operation
ECtHR: European Court of Human Rights
EEC: European Economic Community
EU: European Union
EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
FIR: Flight Information Region
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
IPA: Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
JDP: Justice and Development Party
MIPD: Multiannual Indicative Planning Document
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO: Non-governmental organization
TURKSTAT: Turkish statistical institute
UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
CHAPTER 1
Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation is to study the prospects of cross-border co-operation between Greece and Turkey, with respect to historical, religious, linguistic and cultural characteristics. Cross Border Co-operation (CBC) is a key priority of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument aiming at reinforcing co-operation between member states and partner countries along the external borders of the European Union. The CBC promotes economic and social development in border areas and more specifically it addresses common challenges, it ensures efficient and secure borders while promoting people-to-people co-operation. Thus, the CBC has become an important driving force for the integration between different or similar political, social and financial national systems.

Many times the national borders present obstacles for the development and growth of neighboring countries and this can be a barrier. Cross border co-operation is a complex and sensitive issue for many countries. For this reason, after the Second World War, the European Union promoted cross-border regional co-operation as the most important tool for the integration process in Europe. Nowadays, the main concern of the European Union is the differences in the financial level and political systems of the countries across the European Union’s (EU) external border. The objective of the European Union is to reduce the disparities in the socio-economic field between the border regions of EU and non EU countries.

For this reason, the Cohesion Policy of the European Union aims to promote financial and social cohesion between member states and regions of the EU and thus contribute to reducing the gap between rich and poor countries and regions. The cohesion policy for 2007-2013 has three objectives: firstly the Convergence, secondly the Strengthening of Competitiveness and Employment, and thirdly the European Territorial Co-operation. The European Territorial Co-operation is implemented through the EU Structural Fund and it focuses on three areas:

- Development of cross-border economic and social activities. Establishing and developing transnational co-operation, including bilateral co-operation between maritime regions.
- Enhancing the effectiveness of regional policy by promoting inter-regional co-operation, networking and the exchange of experiences between regional and local authorities. It concerns all EU regions. The elements that influence the cross border co-operation are many such as historical, cultural, and financial as well as other kinds. All these have affected the relationships between the countries and also influenced the political decisions. Countries underwent regional financial integration arrangements in order to achieve financial and political benefits (Baldwin and Venables, 1995 et al., in Kotios et al., 2010).

Greece is geographically located on the external border of the European Union and it comprises an integral part of the Balkan region neighboring with Turkey. In political, socio-cultural, financial and even military terms, Greece and Turkey are two of the major players in Southeastern Europe (Topaloglou and Petrakos, 2008: 1). Greece is a member of the European Union since 1981 and Turkey a candidate country since the Helsinki EU Summit in 1999. Greece’s support for Turkey’s EU membership in 1999 is based on the belief that the EU offers a common, comprehensive vision that provides benefits for all countries. Greek and Turkish relations have always been one of the most difficult issues in all areas. They have a long story of conflict but during the recent years we have noticed an improvement in the financial and tourist areas.

Economic co-operation between Greece and Turkey in the field of foreign trade and investment is a recent phenomenon and this may have a positive effect on bilateral relations. The development of bilateral financial and trade relations, the promotion of investments in both countries and the achievement of these goals favorably affects all levels of co-operation between them and contributes to the continuous deepening of bilateral relations which is very important. Nowadays, the Turkish economy is experiencing a period of significant growth and relative macroeconomic stability. The growth is due to the reform programs promoted by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for the recovery of the Turkish economy and to enhance the accession process to the EU. Moreover, Turkey is an open economy and the flow of capital is free.

1.1 Methodology

The co-operation between countries can be international, bilateral, or cross-border in order to achieve a common goal that is equally important for all the participating states.
A record and analysis of the relationship between the two countries based on existing literature and statistics from official bodies such as Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) will be made. It is worth noting that there was certain difficulty in finding information especially from the Greek side and access to it was not possible. Even though the Greek-Turkish Chamber of commerce of Northern Greece was contacted, there was no response. Moreover, there was insufficient literature referring to cross-border co-operation between Greece and Turkey. It is observed that the data from the co-operation between Greece and Turkey is limited from both sides, with the exception of tourism. This dissertation does not focus on the international relations between the two countries because that is not its aim but rather puts more emphasis on the spatial interactions.
CHAPTER 2

Borders: Literature review

2.1 A short introduction

The borders of antiquity has been a sensitive issue for all people and it remains until today one of the main causes of conflict between the two countries. This is because all states at one degree or another, seek to identify and reproduce their national identity, which is among others a collective perception of "us" rather than "others" (Anderson, 1983 and Billing, 1995 in Topaloglou and Petrakos, 2008). There are a lot of recorded sayings on the border or territorial sovereignty at times that highlight the uniqueness of every nation over another, but I will highlight two contradictory sayings of the ancient Greeks, the first is "show me your land and I will show you your home" and the other is "anyone who is not Greek is a barbarian". The first quote means that territorial boundaries and limitations are of no importance and a man can consider his home to be anywhere in the world where he or she has the ability to stay.

The second quotation was used by ancient Greeks to show their geographical entity, and the differences noted by the word "barbarian" means a foreigner or the person that does not speak Greek. Therefore, the attitude of people is a crucial factor for future relationships or partnerships that will develop in the future, particularly in border areas. The more homogenous the population in terms of state ethnic, religious, social and financial reasons, the smaller the differences in perceptions of "who we are". Through this relationship collective and individual identities of "us" and "others" result in prioritizing multi-dimensional images and perceptions of the border areas (Newman, 2000 et al., in Topaloglou and Petrakos, 2008).

On the other hand, not only the rapid development of information technology, communications and transport, but also the widely internationalized cultural norms, make images and representations of a border, a complicated case to the extent that it makes the perceptions different (Ohmae, 1990 et al., in Topaloglou and Petrakos, 2008). However, from the late 20th and early 21st century there has been a significant increase in regional and interregional co-operation. Specifically, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War upset the geopolitical stability resulting in states co-operating at a regional level to create political stability and normalcy as regards to their trade.
According to Houtum (2000), at the European level it is observed that between the 1950s - during the end of World War II and the beginning of the European integration process - during the 1980s state and national borders in Europe where remarkably stable.

But it is worth noticing that the role and contribution of the European Union was of catalytic importance in the field of co-operation between states because it promoted regional and interregional co-operation not only among countries which are member states but also and in acceding countries. Today, programs such as INTERREG, support these efforts to make financial instruments work since "cross border co-operation on the external borders of the EU is a key priority for both the European Neighborhood Policy and the Partnership Instrument. The adoption of the European Neighborhood Policy and Partnership Instrument has considerably enhanced the scope of cross border co-operation, both qualitatively and quantitatively".¹

The question that arises is whether the final cross-border partnerships have helped to remove border barriers or instead made the border "lines" more distinct. A clear answer is difficult to be given because of the complexity of the issue. In a world of security alerts, enhanced personal mobility (for many, but not all), and transnational flow of goods, finances, and services we encounter not a borderless world but a lot of borders which are not only found "at the border". Borders are no longer seen only as lines on a map but as spaces in their own right (as in the idea of "borderlands") and as processes, in short, there has been a shift from borders to bordering or re-bordering, in some cases (Rumford, 2011).

They "now occupy a multiplicity of sites and seep into the city and the neighborhood in addition to existing at the edges of a polity" (Amoore and Salter, 2008). Despite all this progress and the development of relations between these countries there are still problems and issues which have not found a solution until now. Eventually we have to wonder if a border is just a simple "line" on the map or it symbolizes something more.

than the division of a country. And if this line interacts both with the economy of a
country and the perceptions of the residents.

2.2 Borders and economic growth

The existence of borders can affect either the growth of a country positively or
negatively? Many researchers believe that borders are "obstacles" regarding financial
transactions and free flow of goods and services between countries, but these obstacles
have now been suspended? According to a definition from Nijkamp, Rietveld and
Salomon, barriers are obstacles in space or time that [apart from normal average
distance fiction costs in spatial interaction] impede on a smooth transfer of free
movement of information and activities (in Houtum, 2000). According to Clark (1994),
borders restrict the freedom to move from one side of the border to another. Balassa
(1961) and Di Tella, (1982) argue that studying financial barriers of borders in
particular has been associated with the imposition of tariffs, quotas or other restrictions
in the debate of free or protective trade (in Topaloglou and Petrakos, 2007). The
provision of financial development of these barriers should be eliminated.

Thus from the creation of the European Union up to now, the liberal movement of
goods, people, services and capital are dominant and overarching goals for the financial
welfare of citizens of member states. "With the Maastricht Treaty, the European
Economic Community was renamed and the Treaty established the European
Community and the States Parties decided to create the Common Market, in which
goods, people, services and capital would be exchanged. The objective of establishing
the Common Market was to increase trade and financial development activities of the
member states which would lead to a continued expansion of national economies and
raising living standards in the Community (Maravegias and Tsinisizelis, 2007: 540).

This was the first "step" of removal of border barriers within the euro area countries and
on the 25th March 1957 under the Treaty of Rome, the six member states decided to
build a European Economic Community which was based on a wider common market,
which covered a wide range of goods and services. Custom duties between the six
countries were completely abolished on July 1st, 1968 and common policies, particularly
for trade and agriculture, were also implemented during the early 1960s. On January

1st, 1973 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Union by increasing the number of member states to nine. Thus the Europe of "6" in 1951, with all the enlargements that occurred in Europe ended with "27" in 2007. With all these enlargements and the acceding countries, the creation of the single market, followed and as a result the borders of the European Union were "removed" from the member states which had as their direct objective the welfare of their citizens. This removal of borders was not only financial but it also helped to develop partnerships in other areas such as at the political, social and cultural level (Brym, 2011).

With the enlargement of the EU external borders, and the creation of a common market including the, monetary and customs union each unified state of Europe can no longer be considered unique and a result has to take a "European identity". The EU, aware that mutual respect for cultural differences is essential to increase cross-border integration and develop a common European identity across national borders, increased its funding for "soft projects" that were to improve intercultural dialogue in the region and establish the framework for a shared European identity (Kepka and Murphy, 2002 in Brym, 2011). According to Grix and Knowles (2002) the cross-border projects included funding for language studies, soccer matches, and student exchanges, all gatherings designed to increase cultural contact and understanding between neighboring countries (in Brym, 2011). However, the European Union creates and includes partnerships with countries that are member states or under accession in order to make its economy more competitive and commercial.

To strengthen the efforts at the CBC the European Union is funding various programs (e.g. Interreg) through the European Regional Development Fund to promote regional development and to jointly address the problems of the external borders of the country. The first Euro region was along the German - Dutch border (Euregio) in 1958, and more than 70 cross-border entities started to operate under this name in Europe, until the present day. This was done in an accelerating process involving all the border areas of the European Union (EU), stimulated by the INTERREG-A Community Initiative financial support. This initiative was converted into the third Community Support Framework (European Territorial Co-operation), since 2007, which not only aims to reinforce co-operation at the cross-border level, but also at the transnational and interregional levels, respectively, related to the previous INTERREG -B and C strands.
Anderson states it is important to clarify the concept of barrier effect, since "borders and their adjacent regions constitute gateways and opportunities as well as barriers" and the pre-conditions to set up a Euro region involve intensified economic, social, cultural, environmental and institutional co-operation, which can only take place when border barriers are somewhat eroded in all these domains, in the Euro region area (in Medeiros, 2010).

In contrast, Batten and Tomqvist (1990) claimed that the frontier separating two nations is one of the most pervasive of all barriers and that some "cosmopolitan centers that serve as key nodes in the international economic system nowadays have much stronger links to one another than to their surrounding regions", thus challenging the traditional principles of geographical contiguity (in Medeiros, 2010). The programs which aim to promote cross-border co-operation are the Interreg, Phare, TACIS and MEDA. Interreg aimed at transnational, interregional and transnational co-operation. The Phare Program is the main financial instrument of accession strategy for Central and Eastern Europe which are candidates for EU membership. Initially, the Phare program applied only to countries of Central and Eastern Europe but has now extended to candidate countries of the Western Balkans. The TACIS program aims to promote the transition to a market economy and to strengthen democracy and the rule of law in partner countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia moreover the Meda program aims to implement co-operative measures designed to help non-Mediterranean countries to reform their economic and social structures and reduce the effects of growth in social and environmental terms (Europa).

So, the regional identity has become an important category in the “Europe of regions”, and one that is often taken as self-evident in the relations between a group of people and a bounded region. The movement of people, capital and information across spatial boundaries that takes place in the contemporary world challenges the supposed harmonious link between regions and people on all spatial scales. First, the identity of a region refers to those features of nature, culture and inhabitants that are distinguished and in fact can be used in the discourse of science, politics, cultural activism or economics to differentiate a region from others. This occurs in the construction of

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divisions, regional marketing, governance and political regionalization (Paasi, 2011). The borders of Europe and the variability after the enlargements constituted an interesting subject of study for many analysts around the world. According to Ruggie, Europe provides an excellent laboratory for exploring how border regions offer new spaces of/for governance, cultural interaction, and financial development (in Johnson, 2009).

However, there are many people who have an opposite view and believe that all these expansions that have taken place and that will happen in the future will be lost or tamper with the European element. One of the difficulties in the search for trends and stands in European studies is in that it is difficult to define what is really European. There is much debate on what belongs to Europe and what does not. What are the borders of Europe? (Topaloglou et al., 2005). Apart from the “alteration” of the European identity, they are likely to have negative consequences in financial relations.

The internal EU regions being on the whole the most advanced are worried that the abolition of trade barriers and the free movement of capital will have negative implications for their financial integration and for their performance (Houtum, 2000). In the general framework, the classical theory study of border states concludes that the impact of borders on financial activity would result in greater physical distance. According to Houtum (2000), Giersch argued that the border reduces the size of the potential market area and Losch that the state tariffs at national borders could be responsible for lengthening the economic distance between countries. Also, Losch argues that “Tariffs are like rivers which separate their banks financially more than would correspond to their actual width” (in Houtum, 2000).

There is also the case that cross-border interaction is diffused in the border area, but mainly in metropolitan concentrations of two neighboring countries fueling the polarization and the borders it can act as a "tunnel" (Petrakos and Topaloglou, 2007). Although the borders nationally and at the European level have "disappeared", concerns remain about the impact that it would have on the economy and the land. Despite concerns borders exhibit a unique set of resonances across the space/time of an apparently globalized world of mobile people and things and that of the sovereign practices of the state. Put simply, emergent forms of bordering seek to reconcile security with mobility and sovereignty with economy (Amoore, 2011). The intensive
preoccupation with the issues of border area, did not provide clear answers today to the questions regarding the territorial forces deployed in border regions where economic borders are abolished (Niebuhr and Stiller, 2002 in Petrakos and Topaloglou, 2007).

2.3 Borders and perceptions

A border line does not only define a place on the ground but this "line" has a big impact on perceptions of residents and relations of the countries that it separates. Stereotypes, prejudices and perceptions of years are not only hardwired in residents of border regions, but these views prevail and at national level. The factors which affect the relationship between residents between sites are the historical past, religion and language. Leimgruber (1980 and 1991) argued that borders should be seen as human creations or social constructs, conditioned by human creations, social constructs, human perceptions and attitudes toward space (in Houtum, 2000). Paasi (2011) states that "rather than neutral lines, borders are often pools of emotions, fears and memories that can be mobilized apace for both progressive and regressive purposes".

A border line both in the physical and the imaginary dimension contributes decisively to the emergence of "us" against "others". Indeed one could argue that a border line determines largely who are 'inside' and who are "outside". In other words, the identity of "we" implies the existence of "others" (Topaloglou and Petrakos, 2005). For example, in Europe, the borders of East-West for almost half a century were not only a dividing line between two different politico-economic systems. The word boundaries in the subconscious of many people suggests the fear that is a place with fences or the view that this is a place with hostile intentions against them or that it is far from what is real (Topaloglou and Petrakos, 2005).

This overestimation of the distance is interpreted as a low degree of personal experience and knowledge regarding those cities. Thus, the city in the neighboring country is relatively far away (Houtum, 2000). Lately, after the recent enlargements of the European Union, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 to the European family, there is concern whether all these expansions have contributed to the improvement of the relations between countries. Houtum states that "in a world where societies and people are becoming increasingly interlinked, the perceived need to emphasize the differences and asymmetries between countries and people has also increased". Despite new incentives to encourage cross-border exchanges many scholars
are more critical about the contributions euro-regions have made toward the development of a regional identity transcending national borders. Despite the increasing movement across borders, Struver (2005) argues that nations remain the main source by which people negotiate their identity.

In Struver’s view, the development of an interrelated borderland will create a co-operative space but not a borderless space, as borders will remain important markers of national identity. The euro-regions may have successfully provided the financial framework for local infrastructural projects, but they have failed to create a cultural and communicative environment that supports the development of an interactive cross-border community (Durrschmidt, 2001 and Kratke, 1998, in Brym, 2011). It is responsible not just for the border line that separates two people, but it also contributes to it, with factors such as language, religion and the culture of a nation. Religious beliefs are a fundamental pillar of society and in most cases it is the "means" for social cohesion. Religion is often a feature of the national identity of each country and it contributes to the formation of ideologies, political views and attitudes.

Therefore, the impact of religion in shaping political decisions is powerful to the point that many times it ruptures relations between church and state. This contradictory role of religion is observed both at European and international level. It has been observed that countries that have a common religion reach collaborations, more easily, regardless of distance and borders, for example, Greece and Russia. For Gave (1998) the term “border” suggests that construction of a religious boundary. It has to be acknowledged that recognition of borders between traditions appears to accept the existence of discrete demarcation lines that separate one religion from another. Sometimes, human rights are being violated because of the ideology that each religion has. A typical example is that of liberties violations in Turkey in which the lack of religious freedom, and the violation of human rights, makes countries that it co-operates with, deal with it with some suspicion.

It should be noted that violations of religious freedoms are not only present in totalitarian regimes, but also in democratic. "The democratic constitutional state that promises to protect constitutionally the equal right for religious freedom operates with this very constitutional right in the religious field and at its boundaries” (Reuter, 2009). It thus transgresses its own sphere of competence as laid down by the constitution and
infringes on religious self-determination and, in consequence, religious freedom. The constitutional right to religious freedom is marked by a double dilemma. It implicates the state and its institutions [up to the legislative and judiciary branches] into the conflict ridden charting of the boundaries of the religious field. Furthermore, it demands that believers who want to exercise their right to religious freedom in a conflict situation discursively filter their religious convictions according to secular law and jurisdiction on religion (Reuter, 2009).

The religious situation in Europe has preoccupied many scientists. The religious situation of Europe has attracted the attention of scholars because of its alleged singularity. On a global scale, Europe appears to be "the exceptional case" is it a multinational entity, or is it a construct? The nation states still operate as the main determinants of culture and research (Davie, 2000). The co-existence of church and state member countries in the European Union varies from country to country because it depends on the degree of church vs. state co-existence. The evidence available confirms that in Europe, the Christian tradition prevails, which is reflected in the formation of the canon law of the European states. The statistics inevitably arise from the available information, but they vary from one country to another.

In Germany for example, we have books of the christening names of those members who leave their churches. In Greece as sources of such information we have books of baptisms and marriages that took place. In other countries we have the statement made by citizens if they wish, concerning their religious identity and integration. The result of statistical research by Acadimia⁴ showed that the situation in the member states of the European Union can be described as follows:

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From the above statistical research we come to the conclusion that Christians are the majority and that the Muslim community has a small percentage. Religion can create problems in relations between states and stand as an obstacle in subsequent collaborations that may arise. An example is Turkey, which had submitted an application to become part of the EEC in 1959 and has been a candidate country since 1999. The reasons that Turkey is not in the European family are the lack of democracy, the demographic problem and many more reasons that will be presented in detail below, but one of the major factors inhibiting integration is Islam. Even research in the EU, showed that countries with Catholic or Orthodox roots were more "European" rather than Protestants, showing that religious beliefs influence their perceptions in relation to "others" at the border (Topaloglou and Petrakos, 2005).

Religion is a sensitive issue and the opening of borders and the great movement of migrants is becoming more topical with time. Thus, scholars sought to understand the role of religious communities in the integration of the mostly European-originated immigrants, as well as the effects of religious affiliation on these immigrants' socioeconomic success (Menjívar, 2006). Although most countries have legislation that protects the right of religious freedom, the issue of religious freedom is an issue facing most member states and the EU and it seems that it is difficult to solve. Reuter (2009) states that «The democratic constitutional state that promises to constitutionally protect the equal right for religious freedom operates with this very constitutional right in the religious field and at its boundaries. It thus transgresses its own sphere of competence as laid down by the constitution and infringes on religious self-determination and, in consequence, religious freedom». 

### Table 2.1: The religions of Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>55.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>13.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglicans</td>
<td>6.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>3.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unresponsive, etc.</td>
<td>18.25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4 Borders and language

Another problem is language, which is the main means of communication between people since it is integral to the culture of every country. It is common knowledge that language affects partnerships and agreements arising or having arisen among the sites. Meinhof et. al (2003) argues that not only the language *per se*, but even the pronunciation of the language itself, plays an important symbolic role in separating or uniting people (in Topaloglou and Petrakos, 2005). There are exceptions and the use of common language between two countries always coincides with the identification of concepts and common cultural norms, like the saying "England and America are two countries separated by the same language" (George Bernard Shaw).

Europe since the beginning of the unification of the states realized that there had to be a "common code of reference" in order to have harmony between states, institutions and bodies. So in 1958 it had four official languages which have now risen to twenty three. The European Union has stressed the importance of multilingualism of Europe from the very beginning, in 1958, with Regulation No 1 of the Council of Ministers, which determined the four official working languages of the European Economic Community. Since then, the official languages of all joining member states have been regarded as equal, having the status of official European Union languages raised to twenty (Tender and Vihalem, 2009).

The reasons why the European Union needs twenty official languages are not hard to find: they are democracy, transparency and the right to knowledge. EU legislation is applied throughout the EU, and therefore to all its citizens. New legislation must be published and made available to them in their own language. As in any democracy, each citizen has a fundamental right to know why a particular item of legislation is being adopted and what it requires him or her to do. Europe also recognizes the dialects in the member states but there are problems with their official recognition. The majority of Europe's legal systems recognize within the borders of particular states a number of minority languages

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Which languages are recognized as minority languages, how their status is defined, and in which domains these languages may be used varies considerably from country to country and depends very much on particular political constellations. There is also a considerable fuzziness concerning terminology in the field: in some contexts, minority languages are referred to as regional languages, in others as lesser used languages or as indigenous minority languages (Cillia and Busch, 2006). Europe based on democratic ideals always gives special attention to language policies (European programs such as Socrates and Lingua support these policies), not only for the official languages of the Union, but also for minority and dialects in border areas.

Thus, “multilingual” Europe is one of the most important trading partners internationally. With the establishment of official languages, the European Union wanted to mitigate and alleviate the problems that existed in institutions, particularly in trade between countries. "Multilingualism is a value for the intercultural dialogue, social cohesion and prosperity. It plays an important role in lifelong learning, media and information technologies, and external relations of the EU to facilitate access to essential services for tourists, foreign workers, students and immigrants who do not know the national language well. Basic information should be provided in various languages."

Multilingualism is aimed at social welfare, the mobility of students and workers in lifelong learning and social cohesion. In this key role the media, new technologies and translation services will help citizens, businesses and national administrations. Therefore, member states are encouraged to collaborate with stakeholders and the media to stimulate development and adoption of new technologies. All this happened because the European Union is culturally and linguistically a much more diverse area than economically comparable areas, in particular the USA and Japan. Over the years there have been many attempts to enhance the communication between European businesses and citizens through development of machine translation tools.

A particularly important attempt was the Eurotra project that lasted from 1982 to 1993 and was funded by the European Commission (Durand et al., 1991, in Sadeniemi et al.,

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2008). For international and supranational communication, there are in principle two different models: firstly the lingua franca a dominant language model, according to which (e.g., English, French) serves as a means of communication between different language communities, and secondly a model of linguistic pluralism, or linguistic diversification, according to which as many different languages as possible are used as a means of communication. In Europe, a pluralistic model of communication is pursued, at least among theoreticians, and European multilingualism is accepted as an important element of the European identity (Cillia and Busch, 2006).

Another advantage of the multilingual environment is that all citizens of the member states can have access to official documents of the Union in whatever language they can understand. "As the EU expands to include ever more countries, the tradeoff between equal treatment and economic efficiency becomes increasingly apparent. It is obviously important to ensure that citizens of Europe have access to relevant information about EU actions and decisions in a language that they can understand" (Fidrmuc and Ginsburgh, 2004). Yet, translating tens of thousands of documents per year into twenty different languages and providing interpreting services for EU meetings and sessions of the European Parliament is very costly. As the number of official EU languages increases, so do the various inefficiencies inherent to a multi-lingual organization such as the EU (Fidrmuc and Ginsburgh, 2004).

One question that raises concerns for analysts is that there is "equality "among the official languages of the European Union and this is a myth if they cannot be used at the same degree. It is certain that all twenty-three languages cannot be spoken with the same frequency because the states don’t have the same size and population. The language most widely used is English. According to Tender and Vihalem (2009), authors such as Caviedes (2003) Lenaerts (2001), Vanting (2006) consider that the European Union is only holding up a multilingual mask to the face of the reality, that the usage of English is increasing compared to other languages.

The dominance of English, French and German in the European Union is raising concerns. German is the most widely spoken mother tongue in the European Union with about 90 million native speakers. French, English and Italian are each the mother tongue of around 60 million EU citizens (Tender and Vihalem, 2009). However, English is spoken by about one third of EU citizens as their first foreign language, putting it well
ahead of German and the others as the most widely used language of the European Union. German and French are each spoken as a first foreign language by about 10% of the EU population\(^8\). If only English, French and German were to be used as official languages of the EU, the differences in disenfranchisement rates across countries would remain considerable. Nonetheless, several smaller languages could be considered borderline cases, at least when judged on the merits of economic efficiency—though political considerations are likely to play an important role as well. Having access to documents in one’s own language increases one’s welfare, but the same resources might be spent more efficiently on other welfare enhancing measures (Fidrmuc and Ginsburgh 2004).

The native language of each nation is an integral part of the history and culture passed on from generation to generation through time. Naturally, over time the language evolves, updated and enriched with new concepts and words, but the base remains "flawless." Behind each word or phrase hides a short story, the culture and traditions of a nation. We note that within limits of a country many times there are various dialects and in this way every single villager wants to highlight its uniqueness and diversity.

Therefore, language plays an important role and naturally it has an impact on the cooperation between the Members affecting the perception of others, differently either negatively or positively. As mentioned by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein "If we spoke a different language, we would perceive a somewhat different world".

\[2.5 \text{ Concluding Remarks}\]

What emerges from this is that studies on the issue of borders face a multitude of questions that most times are difficult to answer. What we realized is that according to how strongly a nation or individual resident feels about the issue of borders and everything that it entails affects the business and financial development of countries. Also it is noted that the perceptions of inhabitants have a significant either positive or negative impact on cross-border relations between states leading to the border fence or function as a bridge in relations between the countries involved.

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Although borders with their traditional form have almost disappeared because of advances in technology, road infrastructure and the Internet they are still "visible". Even today, the border area is often controversial and some parts become a reason of disagreement between countries that it "separates". The land or sea borders still suggest the sovereign rights of every country to which they belong. Especially in relations between Greece and Turkey borders are a sensitive issue and it is always current on the political and economic “agenda”, of the two countries and the policies that follow.
 CHAPTER 3

Political and economic characteristics of Turkey

3.1 A short introduction

In this chapter I will make a brief literature review of the politico-economic situation of Turkey, the Greek-Turkish relations, the Cyprus issue, Turkey’s perspective membership concerning the European Union and its relationship with the other member states. Turkey has attracted the interest of many analysts both financially and politically because of the political developments and the changes that it has undergone internally and in conjunction with its financial development particularly in recent years and they are an area of researching interest. The relations between Greece and Turkey are characterized by tension, conflicts, disagreements and periods of relative "calm".

3.2 Political situation in Turkey

A special feature of the Turkish political life is that there has not been a period in time that has not been interesting to the observer (Triantopoulos, 2008). From the time the Ottoman Empire was replaced by the Turkish Republic a lot of changes have taken place both economically and politically. For too long the course of Turkey has been influenced by powerful state, constitutional and economic shocks that create violent turbulence in the modernization process of the Turkish state structures and good neighborly relations with neighboring countries of the subsystems of Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. History in the course of decades of the twentieth century will show that domestic political and socioeconomic crisis in Turkey are a common phenomenon for the short and turbulent journey of the country from 1923 until today (Litsas, 2007).

Since the creation of the newly established Turkish rule until today, religion and the political power are closely connected. “Even Kemal Ataturk in co-operation with Ismet Inonu, who proceeded to bring radical reforms such as banning Islamic courts, still believed that the Islamic religion was an undeniable part of the national identity of Turkish people” (Karabelias, 2009: 30). It is noticed that in all political developments specifically from 1950-1980, and specifically during the coup of 1960 the influence of Islam in political and financial issues were strong. In 1980, the seizure of power by the military establishment led to the punishment of the party leaders with a ban of their ten
year civil rights. After this period, parties were re-established contributing to economic development, with particular emphasis on Islamic business. No significant changes were realized in the political and financial life of the country with the liberalization of the economy even with the rise of Erbakan to power in 1996, who argued that Ataturk’s principles where an essential basis for the government (Karabelias, 2009: 30). In general, the Turkish party system can be characterized as unstable and vulnerable to external factors. The party system in Turkey is still rather unstable and voter volatility is very high. One of the main reasons for this is the absence of a socially rooted party system (Tezcur, 2009, in Altmann et al., 2011).

Naturally all this political instability of the country has had a negative impact on economic growth. Something begun to change in the political life of the country with the election of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as its leader who had also been the mayor of Istanbul in the past. But with the rise of Erdogan in 2002 we had the same Islamic character of the policy of Turkey. Even today, the problems that the country's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan faces with the Kemalist establishment are a lot, even though he has tried to reconcile with the Islamic rule, there has not been much success. It should be noticed that military authorities of the Turkish state have a strong presence in political life to this day. Despite these internal problems, Erdogan's party places special emphasis on foreign policy and the development of relations not only with neighboring countries but also at an international level.

This multidimensional approach to foreign policy was very much influenced by Ahmet Davutoğlu's "strategic depth" perspective. Foreign policy is no longer perceived as a series of bilateral relations or foreign policy moves but as a series of mutually reinforcing and interlocking processes. In this respect, Davutoğlu argues that in order to formulate a long-lasting strategic perspective one needs to take into account "historical depth", which provides a sound assessment of the links between the past, present, and future, as well as a "geographical depth, penetrating into the intricate dynamics of the relations between domestic, regional, and global factors" (Onis and Yilmaz, 2009). The geo-cultural, geo-political, and geo-economic factors that contribute to the strategic depth of a country can only be genuinely interpreted at the intersection of these historical and geographic paradigms. He argues that the more Turkey tenses its bow within Asia, the further and more precisely will its arrow extend into Europe.
Hence, he states that "If Turkey does not have a solid stance in Asia; it would have very limited chances with the EU" (Onis and Yılmaz, 2009). With this argument, the foreign minister of Turkey wants to make the geo-strategic position of his country and its influence at an international level obvious, so that’s why it is called the central country. So, Turkey can’t be the sole part of Europe or Asia because it belongs to both geographical regions and the objective of Turkish foreign policy was the attempt of European and Asian elements co-existing. Due to all the difficulties encountered the government of Erdogan and his party JDP not only failed to bring reform but also to shift the Turkish public opinion towards a European path.

Still, it appears that the Turkish foreign policy is more "conciliatory" compared to the past even with countries that historically it had strong confrontations and are now their diplomatic contacts. The Europeanization of the Turkish foreign policy helped towards this. The Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy from this angle could be analyzed by looking at the changes in Turkish foreign policy with regards to its Middle East neighbors, as these changes seem to illustrate the increased use of diplomatic / financial instruments versus military means. Turkey's relations, especially with Iraq and Syria, have been seen as high politics, involving major threats to national interests, specifically with respect to the Kurdish terrorism. This issue involves Turkish national unity and a complicated combination of domestic identity and foreign politics (Müftüler-Bac and Gürsoy, 2010). The most significant of these contacts is Turkish President Abdullah Gül's brief landmark visit to Armenia on September 6, 2008, to attend the World Cup qualifying match between Armenia and Turkey in Yerevan.

In doing so, he utilized "football diplomacy" as an opportunity to open channels of communication as a first step towards addressing diplomatic and political challenges in bilateral relations, as well as promoting co-operation on broader regional issues (Onis and Yılmaz, 2009). With this diplomatic stance Turkey managed to create a major trade and financial collaborations, resulting in the strengthening of the economy. After long periods of economic crises and instability, the policy of the JDP was able to elevate Turkey into a major regional player both in Europe and Asia. Thus, Turkey can play an important role and act as a "peacemaker" in the Middle East. Furthermore, as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member since 1952, Turkey has been an important security provider for Europe and has also been socialized into a common identity that revolves around NATO.
Turkey's willingness to contribute to European security after 2003 shows that the Turkish military and government still support taking joint decisions with other European countries, at least for operations that draw upon NATO assets and add to the security of the continent. The Turkish active participation in the NATO missions in Afghanistan, in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in Lebanon in 2006, and in the EU-led operations in the Balkans, all indicate an Europeanization of foreign policy where Turkey demonstrated its ability to act as a team player for the EU. Even though Turkish participation in the EU-led operations is an important indicator of diffusion of European norms among decision-makers, it is clear that Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy is also conditioned by strategic interests (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2010). With the economic crisis, especially at European level, and problems at home, Turkey should define what "line" it must ultimately follow and if all these steps forward will be maintained in the future.

3.3 General economic profile of Turkey

As mentioned above all this political instability influenced the development process of Turkey decisively and the political stability was a prerequisite for the recovery of the Turkish economy which until the early years of the millennium was a typical case of an economy with high political risk. The performance and its investment environment was identified by intense political-military developments and state interventionism determining the overall effectiveness of the economic process and distribution of money (Triantopoulos, 2008). Turkey adopted protectionist import-substitution strategies during 1950-1980. A fundamental change began in the 1980s with the adoption of liberal economic policies and Turkey began to integrate its economy with that of the world.

The considerable change in 1980 was caused by the adoption of stabilization precautions, which inclined to liberalize the economy as a whole. The Turkish economy is an interesting case-study of a country that has been liberalizing since the early 1980s hoping to become a large recipient of foreign investment, but with no remarkable results. Turkey’s liberalization efforts have been hampered by structural changes, crises and the socio-political conditions in the country. The transformation of the Turkish economy and trade structure are similar to that of the other emerging market economies. Turkey, after adopting an outward oriented trade strategy in the 1980s, was
able to increase its world export share from 0.36 to 0.60 in 2000 (Uctum and Uctum, 2011).

Meanwhile, the average export growth exceeded 20 per cent after the financial crises in 2001. Trade liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, which allowed Turkey to increase business contacts with world production networks, resulted in shifting resources from traditional sectors, such as textiles and agriculture, towards the non-traditional high-technology intensive sectors, such as transport vehicles and consumer electronics (Saygılı and Saygılı, 2010). In 1980, Turkey pursued financial liberalization policies, including the elimination of most direct credit programs and preferential rates. However, the redistribution of resources since liberalization has widened the rural-urban disparity and resulted in the deterioration of income distribution in Turkey, both at the national and regional (provincial) level (Onder and Ozyldrm, 2010).

Turkey is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, especially when compared to the Central and Eastern European, Balkan, and Middle Eastern countries. The amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) received in Turkey began to increase after the 1980s, mainly with the shift from the protectionist regime to liberal economic implementations. The inflow of FDI rose at an immense rate after 2000 and became vital for the Turkish economy (Temiz and Gökmen, 2011). In 2001 the Turkish economy was vulnerable due to external and internal shocks leading to reduced production by 7.9%, resulting in the debt to grow and the costs of debt repayment to become higher than regular state revenues. In 2002, Erdogan government with the help of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank made the Turkish economy overcome that bad period, resulting in the 2006 growth of the Turkish economy (Triantopoulos, 2008).

In 2009 a favorable report from the International Monetary Fund highlights the potential of Turkey for faster economic recovery compared to other countries with indicators that show positive figures for the increase in consumer confidence, increased domestic demand and capital inflows and trade returning to pre-recession levels. These positive prospects have been assessed by the credit ratings of Turkey with some international rating agencies like S & P's and Fitch. After a steep recovery in 2010 when the Turkish economy grew by 9% year-on-year, the rapid economic expansion continued with a 10.2% year-on-year Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in the first half of 2011.
Financial activity bounced back strongly, which reflected some base effects, but also strong domestic demand growth driven by really low interest rates, strong capital inflows and a rapid acceleration in the growth in bank credit. The private sector remained the main driver of the recovery. In the first half of 2011, private consumption rose by 10.8% year on year, with private-sector investment, which accounts for about 15% of GDP, expanding at a remarkable 31.3% year-on-year (European Union (2011), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012": 45).

In spite of the June Parliamentary elections and the government consumption the growth trajectory continued until today marking the third quarter of 2011 with a growth of 8.2% exceeding analyst expectations, while in nine months the GDP grew by 9.6. An economist of the Royal Bank of Scotland noted «The Turkish economy continues to show growth Asian like» (source: Naftemporiki newspaper)⁹. In short, Turkey is among the strongest in the 20 most developed economies as an emerging global financial power and also a strong industrial country.

### 3.4 Turkey's accession to the European Union

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union the idea of a greater Europe emerged which could overcome the current frame. So on June 22, 1993 the Copenhagen summit announced that "The European Council today agreed that the associated countries of Eastern Europe which wish to may join the European Union. The member country that wishes to become a State of the Union must follow the economic and political rules". (Quermone, 2005: 201-202). Although Turkey did not belong to the West, the role that it played in European history was significant either directly or indirectly. It is an Asian country with only a fraction of the geographical boundaries of Europe, with a distinct culture previously identified by the Ottoman empire and a religion for the majority of residents other than that followed by in European countries. As C. Zepos (ambassador (ret.)), remarks Turkey has the hallmarks of a European country as it is a member of all bodies in which participation requires international recognition as part of the European continent (Frangakis, 2009: 6).

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Turkey’s relations with the European Union since 31st July 1959 when Turkey submitted its first application to join the Union, two months later than Greece. After that a series of agreements followed between Turkey and the European Union. On September 12, 1963, the Ankara Agreement was signed which established a Customs Union between Turkey and EEC which would ensure full integration and on December 1st, 1964 it came into effect\(^{10}\). On November 1970 the agreement was supplemented by an Additional Protocol which set a twenty-two year timetable in order to complete the customs union. The additional obligations for Turkey were designed to align the country with the acquis in key aspects of the single market, especially regarding the technical specifications and standards for industrial products, competitive policy, the abolition of state monopolies and protection of intellectual property rights that make it different from classical customs union, which focuses on the harmonization of duties and commercial policy towards third countries and the liberalization of trade between parties (Maravegias and Tsinizelis, 2007: 513).

Turkey’s relations with the community can be characterized unstable because there were periods of "discontinuation" for example; on January 22, 1982 the European Parliament asked the Council and Commission to suspend the agreement between Turkey and the EEC\(^{11}\). It is essentially a process of "stop-and-go" affected significantly by short-term domestic financial developments including both the domestic and foreign policy agendas of Ankara (Maravegias and Tsinizelis, 2007: 514). On April 14th, 1987 Turkey submitted a new application for membership to the Community on 18th December 1989 the European Commission concludes that the opening of negotiations is premature and Turkey cannot join because of political-economic problems concerning Greek-Turkish disputes and problems in Cyprus (Maravegias and Tsinizelis, 2007: 513). A series of agreements between Turkey and the European Union took place in order to get Turkey to align with the European acquis. Although outstanding issues have not been resolved till today, for example Cyprus, in 1999 the Council of the Helsinki summit officially recognized Turkey as a candidate country and in 2004 membership negotiations began and have lasted until today.

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The European Union financially supports the Pre-accession procedures to enable countries to achieve the goals they set, thus giving financial assistance of € 781.9 million have been earmarked for Turkey from the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) in 2011. The revised Multiannual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) for 2011 - 2013, was adopted by the Commission in June 2011. The new MIPD follows a sector-based approach and aims to focus assistance on political priorities in order to achieve a greater impact. The support is focusing on institutions directly concerned by political reforms in the judiciary and law enforcement services, on adoption and implementation of the acquis in priority areas and on economic, social and rural development. In addition, Turkey is benefiting from a series of regional and horizontal programs under IPA (European Union (2011), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012": 4).

The Enlargement Strategy and Progress Reports 2011 notes that in Turkey there is progress on important issues such as freedom of expression, that the media can now report on sensitive issues such as the Kurdish problem, the rights of minorities and the Armenians but no improvement on the violations of human rights has been seen. Specifically, it states that during the reporting period, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered a total of 418 judgments finding that Turkey had violated rights guaranteed by the ECtHR. The number of new applications to the ECtHR went up for the fifth consecutive year. Since October 2010, a total of 7,764 new applications have been made to the ECtHR. Most of them concern the right to a fair trial and protection of property rights. In September 2011, 18,432 applications regarding Turkey were pending before the ECtHR. Turkey has abided to the majority of ECtHR rulings, including payment of compensation totaling € 24.5 million in 2010 (European Union (2011), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012": 20).

Significant progress has been seen concerning the cultural rights and particularly the Kurdish issue. The outcome of this progress was the authorization for the opening of a Kurdish Language and Literature Department in Muş Alparslan University (European Union (2011), Conclusions on Turkey: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012":39). Turkey's process of transformation, has led from the Islamic culture of
the former Ottoman Empire to the secular state of Ataturk, and then, after the Second World War, and in particular since its association with the European Community (and later the EU), to the adaptation of its constitution and institutions to comply with west European standards. This can only be described as unique, and it has so far been successful in general terms. In recent years one-third of the Turkish Constitution has been changed. Over two hundred new laws have been passed, most of which deal with the modernization of the penal code, the protection of freedom of expression, religious pluralism and human rights (Altmann, et al., 2010).

Another problem highlighted is the strong position of women in Turkish society, which is limited in particular as regards the representation and participation in politics, public administration and education. As the field of education mentioned: The gender gap in secondary education has widened. The sustainability of girls' attendance at higher levels of education has been a challenge. Efforts to eliminate gender bias from school textbooks at all levels of education and training have yet to produce the desired results. Gender stereotyping has been perpetuated by the media (European Union (2011), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012": 32).

Working conditions for the female population is inadequate and violence against women, including crimes are steadily increasing and most of them are crimes at honor. Furthermore the democratic deficits, the human rights abuse particularly against minorities in Cyprus and the Kurdish issue are some of the reasons that prevent the integration of Turkey into the European family. Another stumbling block is that the attempt of democratization in Turkey is obstructed by the army which has an important role and a strong involvement in the political matters of the country by interfering in the democratic processes. Despite the existing problems it should be pointed out that Turkey is an important trading and financial partner for Europe and according to the Enlargement Strategy and Progress Reports 2011, Turkey was the seventh largest partner in the field of trade in 2010. Specifically it states:

“The EU-Turkey Customs Union continues to boost bilateral trade between the EU and Turkey, which totaled € 103 billion in 2010. Turkey is the EU’s seventh biggest trading partner while the EU is Turkey's biggest. Almost half of Turkey's total trade is with the EU and almost 80% of the FDI in Turkey comes from the EU. However, Turkey is not
implementing the Customs Union fully and maintains legislation that violates its commitments under the Customs Union. As a result, several trade issues remain unresolved. A number of Turkey's commitments on removing technical barriers to trade such as import licenses, restrictions on imports of goods from third countries in free circulation in the EU, state aid, enforcement of intellectual property rights, requirements for the registration of new pharmaceutical products and discriminatory tax treatment remain unfulfilled. The EU urged Turkey to remove all remaining restrictions on the free movement of goods, including on means of transport regarding Cyprus, and to implement the Customs Union fully” (European Union (2011), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012": 4).

The reports are made annually in respect to the under acceptance countries reviewing their progress towards meeting the criteria of Copenhagen to the "acquis" and it is a exhaustive and comprehensive report with a fairly standardized structure that aims to achieve a coherent approach towards a single methodology between countries (Frangakis, 2009: 47). In general context, Ankara is pleased with the 2011 report published by the European Commission, but Europe stresses that there are still serious problems that were published in the 2009 report and which remain today. So in order to speed up procedures for the democratization of the state, they call Turkey to respect the principles of good neighborly relations with Greece, to withdraw its troops from the island of Cyprus and find a solution to the Cyprus issue. The geostrategic position of Turkey is an important incentive for acceptance, because it can serve as a "bridge" to establish relations between the East and Europe, and the positive role it can play in areas like South Caucasus and the Middle East. Also, the strong and developing economy make it more attractive at the investment level and this is made known by Ankara.

3.5 Turkey and European Union relations

With all these expansions that have occurred in recent years, opening our borders to the East and the Balkans caused various reactions as regards to the concept of European identity and whether it will alter its characteristics. The West believes that the political system of Turkey is more democratic than other Islamic countries, and the growing economy coupled with the large population and geographical location is attractive for
investors. Advocates for the acceptance of Turkey are Great Britain and Sweden, noting its population and its positive consequences on the European market and European economy without however answering the crucial questions that may arise. Many argue that they alone are not enough and Turkey must fulfill the necessary criteria of the *acquis communautaire*.

Also, the inability of Turkish policy in meeting criteria such as human rights violations, the ban of the Kurdish party, the restriction on press, the role of the military and the lack of distinction between the political and military power are some of the arguments for the non-inclusion and the creation of a special relationship. For example France, Germany and Austria are supporters of a particular relationship, stressing the contradiction between Christian and Muslim, arguing that Turkey’s membership would have negative effects on the European identity. The UK in contrast is the only country that firmly supports Turkey’s inclusion and this is due to the fact that the U.S. promotes the European orientation of Turkey. Despite great efforts by Turkey to join the European Union, a percentage of Turkish citizens do not wish to join believing that the main reason Turkey is not a full member of European is Islam phobia.

Specifically the results presented in the newspaper "Zaman" from a survey conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation in 2010 showed that the percentage of citizens who supported the European perspective of Turkey is 58% in Central Anatolia, while it reaches 91% in south-eastern Anatolia. According to the survey results, 22% want to become a member of the EU because it will ease the visa restrictions, 21% for financial reasons, 13% for the deepening of democratic functioning, 8% for business and professional opportunities, and 7% in order to upgrade their living conditions. Regarding the 26% who are opposed to the European perspective of Turkey, 21% said that the country "can stand on its own two feet", 10% underlines the differences of culture and morals between Turkey and EU member states, 8% said that "the EU does not want Turkey" and 6% wants Turkey to stay outside the EU, simply "because it is a Muslim country", while another 6% felt that "the EU has failed" referring to the economic crisis.

About the "obstacles" that Turkey comes across in its European journey, 22% believe they are due to "fear of strangers and Islam phobia" by Europeans, 7% the "reluctance" of the Europe, 4% due to the concern for "population" of the country, 4% in fear of"
terrorism "and 3% concerning the "Cyprus problem". Also, 49% of Turks believe that Turkey will be accepted "in 5-20 years", while 30% answered "it will never happen". From another survey conducted in 2009 it was found that the perception of Turkish citizens as regards the xenophobic European standards for them is verified by the results obtained. Thus the surveys of the European public opinion on the rates of acceptance of membership is below 20% instead of 30% in 2004 and in Turkey itself, from 73% in 2004 fell to 48%. The media are blamed for this negative climate because they filled the news with propaganda about Muslims and linking them to the terrorist’s attacks of Jihad (Frangakis, 2009: 42).

Another issue that arises with the acceptance of Turkey is that the aged population of Europe will increase by 80 million people, creating social and demographic problems after the accession. Moreover, the attitude of prejudice that France, Germany and Austria have is due to the reaction of their citizens due to problems of immigration and the large wave of illegal immigration entering Europe in recent years. Even the large influence that the extremist Islam has had on the Muslims of France causes concern and this troubled other member states as well. Turkey is also a country where the population size is high enough to cause concern to other European countries due to the rearrangements that it can cause within Europe. In these arguments, Turkey claims its own advantages such as its dynamic economy and foreign policy and that it may help in the relations between Islamic countries and Europe. Ignorance and fear felt by Europeans about Islam and strict rules are the major inhibiting factors.

The question that arises is that if Turkey joined the EU whether there can be an Islamic-European culture. If Turkey eventually joins Europe, will the perceptions of Europeans change? This question is difficult to be answered, but if they eventually manage to become a full member of the European Union, what impact will there be at European level. The readiness of Turkey to join the Union does not by itself lift all the stops to complete the course towards its acceptance. An important factor that may contribute to the integration or the final disinheriance is the future of the union itself (Frangakis, 2009: 43).

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3.6 Greek - Turkish relations

The founding of the Greek and Turkish nation-states in 1827 and 1923 respectively was accompanied by a rigidly ethnocentric view of identity, historiography, political culture, social morphology, territoriality and state power. This was an approach to governance constructed and codified by the rampant nationalism of the 19th century of Europe (Anastasiou, 2009). Greece and Turkey are two countries with a strong history and sometimes the "points" that unite them are those which divide them, such as the Aegean. «The relations between Greece and Turkey are traditionally characterized by tension and instability» (Keridis and Triantafillou, Volkan and Itzkowits, 1994, in Kotios and Petrakos, 2003).

These strained relations dating back to the 19th century after the Greek Revolution of 1821 against the Ottoman Empire. The Greek-Turkish War of 1897, the First Balkan War of 1912-1913, the Asia Minor catastrophe of 1922 resulted in the creation of the new Greek frontiers. The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 is the most important treaty between the two countries during which the exchange of populations took place. During the political term of Eleftherios Venizelos, the first Greek-Turkish approach took place by Kemal Ataturk, who opened new avenues in Greek-Turkish relations. In 1930, the first Treaty of Friendship was signed between the two countries and it was signed in Ankara between Venizelos and Ismet Inonu aiming at a new peaceful period. However, the signing of the Treaty did not mean the automatic elimination of all the problems and so was followed by another pact in 1933 which vouched for the inviolability of their common borders.

But these expectations were discarded and did not have the outcome that the people responsible for the agreements expected. "The outburst of violence against the Greek minority of Istanbul and the emergence of the Cyprus issue in the 1950s had a negative effect on the bilateral relations. Greece and Turkey came to the brink of full scale war in 1974 and the tension had a spillover effect over the Aegean and the rest of the Greek-Turkish disputes. Tension and competition at military and political level continued to be the main patterns of Greek-Turkish relations. Since 1974, Turkey has invaded Greece twice. Both crises (1987, 1996) took place due to the "status of the Aegean" (Topaloglou and Petrakos, 2010).
The third crisis occurred in 1999 and concerned the leader of the PKK-Kurdish rebel Abdullah Ocalan. According to many observers it is considered that the crises that occurred in 1987 and 1996 on the status of the Aegean brought the two countries at the brink of war. The first attempt to reinvigorate the Greek-Turkish relations was in 1988 when the two Prime Ministers Papandreou and T. A. Ozal met in Davos, aiming to bring together the Greek and Turkish entrepreneurs, but the results were not as expected. A second meeting was held in 1991 in Davos, between the Prime Minister Mitsotakis and T. Çiller but again there were no particular results. All this meant that the financial and trade relations between the two countries were affected and this entire climate prevented the development of bilateral economic relations.

Most importantly, the Davos process was a major opportunity for "civil society" and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to express their views on the dispute. Some NGOs and persons were indeed at the very origin of the process, lobbying for the Turkish Premier to initiate the process. NGOs of both countries started advocating the Turkish candidacy for EU membership with the idea that "inside the club" the Turkish government would "respect the rules", i.e. international law (for the benefit of Greece) and human rights European standards (for the benefit of Turkish citizens) (Bertrand, 2003). As it was mentioned by Kutlay (2009), Turkish-Greek relations, however, have not always been characterized by conflict and tension. There have also been periods of rapprochement between the countries during the course of the relationship, so in 1999 there was a new approach in Greek-Turkish relations. The earthquake happened in Turkey in 1999, the humanitarian aid and solidarity shown by the Greek side to the Turkish, brought the two countries closer. In reviving these relations the media contributed, with tributes to Greek rescuers and headlines mentioning the friendship between Greece and Turkey.

Shortly thereafter, in September 1999, the Athens earthquake occurred and Greece in turn accepts Turkish assistance. The disaster brought the two countries closer together both institutionally and socially and that Greek-Turkish rapprochement was put across by many observers as the "earthquake diplomacy". This whole situation has changed the attitude of Greek foreign policy and Greece supported Turkey's accession to the European Union summit in Helsinki in December 1999 Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate for EU membership. Greece's stance toward the prospective
accession of Turkey to the European Union marked a second milestone in the history of Greek policies on Turkey-EU relations. In 1995 Greece had abandoned its veto policy against any improvement of Turkey-EU relations and conceded to the customs union between Turkey and the European Union. This did not mean, however, that Greece would take any concrete measures or implement policies, which would favor the prospect of Turkey's membership to the European Union. The latter was to happen only after the EU Helsinki Summit of December 1999, when support of Turkey's orientation toward the European Union was added to the agenda of Greek diplomacy. According to the new policy, which had the personal touch of the new Foreign Minister George Papandreou, Greece should actively support all efforts made to improve Turkey-EU relations (Grigoriadis, 2003).

The support from the Greek side aimed at Turkey's compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and wanting to persuade through conciliatory attitude as our European partners to agree on the accession of Cyprus, without having resolved the Cyprus issue. This was a success for Greek diplomacy. But the "thorns" in Greek-Turkish relations continue to exist and to create tensions. Turkey denies the territorial sovereignty of Greece, especially after the Imia crisis, and the Turkish Foreign Ministry says there are many islands whose ownership is not specified. Since then the Turkish side insists that in the Aegean there are gray areas of sovereignty that contain at least 100 tiny in size islands some of which are inhabited (as Agathonisi and Farmakonisi). The status of these islands, according to Ankara, is controversial and should be determined through negotiations. It should be noted that under Article 12 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish rule is expressly limited to the coasts and islands lying within three miles of the Turkish coasts (Dokos, 2010).

Another point of controversy is the Greek airspace, which Turkey denies and uses for military flights, in violation of the Flight Information Region (FIR). The main point of dispute between Greece and Turkey is the delimitation of the continental Shelf. The official Greek position is that the shelf is the only Greek-Turkish dispute (the other problems are described as Unilateral Turkish claims). The Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean continental shelf dates from November 1973, when a government decision to allocate licenses to Turkish State companies was published in a Turkish journal which showed that they could conduct investigations in the underwater vicinity of
Greek islands. In this whole situation the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which is a sea area of 200 miles, creates problems and the right to exploit natural resources is the coastal state. Greece has not yet defined this region. The question is ultimately whether these two countries will be able to become friends goes by the time or even compromise and if from vicious enemies they can eventually become friends, but only time and history can show.

3.7 The Cyprus issue

The Cyprus issue is a sensitive issue for both Greece and Turkey and is a problem which remains unsolved for the past 37 years, and I will try to summarize it below. In the summer of 1974, Turkish troops occupied about 37% of the northern part of the island and declared the areas occupied as an "independent state". All this was done under the pretext of the Greek coup in 1974, made by the then Greek military junta against the Cypriot Government. From then until now, 37% of the territory is still occupied, and the Turkish Cypriots call it the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". Turkey wanting to alter the demographic composition of the Cypriot population sent settlers around 1975 who are considered citizens of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". As a result of the Turkish invasion of 1974 162,000 people (32% of Greek Cypriots) are refugees in their own country. From 1974 until today, Turkey continues its challenges as regards the Cyprus issue, although Cyprus since 2004 belongs to the European Union. In 1987, the Customs Union Agreement signed between Cyprus and the EU entered a new dimension when Cyprus submitted its application for accession to the Union in July 1990. The accession negotiations began in 1998 and ended successfully at the end of 2002. On April 16th, 2003, Cyprus signed, along with the other nine acceding countries, the EU Accession Treaty, paving the way to the final stretch to full membership, on May 1st, 2004, and therefore maintains close political, cultural and economic relations with the countries of the EU.

As reported by Kivanc (2008) the change in the nature of Turkey-EU relations in the post-1999 period and its impact on the prospect of the solution of the Cyprus problem

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provide a crucial case study to observe how a candidate country's Europeanization and democratization impacted on both her key foreign policy issues and definition of her identity in a specific regional context. For Turkey, the Cyprus problem has not been an ordinary foreign policy issue since its inception. Defined as a 'national cause', it had clear repercussions on the power struggle in Turkey between the parties of status quo and change in domestic politics and foreign policy.

It has been affecting not only Turkey's relations with the EU but also the internal dynamism of Turkish democracy because of its high nationalist resonance used by the hardliner circles in Turkey as a populist tool. As for the occupied part of the island of which, the government has no control the EU legislation is suspended in line with Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty 2003. This means, for example, that these areas are outside the customs and fiscal territory of the EU. However, the suspension does not affect the personal rights of Turkish Cypriots as EU citizens. They are citizens of a Member State, the Republic of Cyprus, even though they may live in the areas not under government control\textsuperscript{15}. If Turkey wants to become a full member of the European Union, one of the many commitments is that it will help to resolve the Cyprus issue. However, there is intransigence on the part of the Turkish side. One day before the anniversary of the invasion in Cyprus, Prime Minister Erdogan in statements made to Turkish Cypriot journalists said that during the presidency of Southern Cyprus in the European Union, there will be no communication for six months between Europe and Turkey because they cannot talk with a country whose existence they do not accept meaning of course Cyprus.

Furthermore he stressed that he would continue the embargo and that there is no chance of opening Turkish ports and airports to Cypriot ships and aircrafts\textsuperscript{16}. Many external international participants such as the U.S. have expressed at times several initiatives to bring the two sides to the negotiating table. In 2004 the United Nations imposed a plan for resolving the Cyprus problem, known as the Annan Plan. During the referendum, 65\% of the Turkish Cypriot side voted for the proposed solution, while 76\% of Greek Cypriots voted against it (Kivanc, 2008). There have been many (and intense)


discussions about the shortcomings of the Annan Plan for Cyprus and most analysts are still questioning the functionality and viability. During the last year there have been intercommoned talks on the Cyprus problem (Dokos, 2010). The attitude of the Turkish side makes it difficult to reach a consensus and thus compromise.

3.8 Conclusions

The statement by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu that there are no problems with neighbors as we saw above in both the Greek-Turkish relations and that the Cyprus issue is not valid. Especially lately with provocative statements that Kastelorizo belongs to the Mediterranean and not to the Greek area and that the naval and merchant ships of Turkey, like any other country have the freedom to move around the Aegean creating tensions between the two sides creating nationalist feelings in both nations. For this reason the Greek side should support Turkey's full membership in the European Union if it complies with conditions set by the "Copenhagen criteria" and to push the delimitation of the continental shelf.

A country like Turkey, can contribute politically even as a major energy hub in the Caucasus, the Middle East, Iraq and Iran. It’s economic development and the geo-strategic position make it a major player in the international political system. Sure, there are a lot of reservations from countries member states, for example from France, Germany concerning the inclusion of Turkey and the result due to its population size, lack of democracy and the internal problems that it faces. If Turkey fails to fully comply with European standards and not align with the values of the European Union, the integration will be difficult. The Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue are a matter of the utmost importance for the Union.

This is also evident from the annual progress report of the European Commission stating that Turkey should intensify efforts to find a solution on outstanding issues for both sides. Regarding Cyprus, the European Commission urged Turkey to avoid dispute with Cyprus and to intensify negotiations to find a solution. Nobody can know or predict what will eventually come to happen.
CHAPTER 4

Co-operation between Greece and Turkey at national level

4.1 Introduction

As established in the previous chapter the relations between Greece and Turkey have had complications and complexities for centuries. There are periods of recession, and disagreements on issues which are vital for both countries and which often bring controversy. All these have implications for the financial and social level and naturally affect relations between people and the prospects of cross-border co-operation. Sometimes the border can operate either as a "bridge" or as a "wall." The European Union tried to eliminate this phenomenon of "wall" or "barrier" created by borders in countries which are member states or under accession, with financial programs. However, this idea actually has to deal with many obstacles and problems, such as economic inequalities, cultural differences, religion, language rather than the historical differences which separate two countries. The collaboration proved easier when countries with similar historical, cultural or linguistic characteristics, had to co-operate rather than with countries that where incompatible. Furthermore dealing with the different implications concerning the implementation of the program had not been given the proper attention.

There will not be many non political institutions of the EU that can help with the formation of the co-operation, but also with the removal of the borders in the mind of people living in border areas. That is to say, collective memories and histories of relations play a significant role in the implementation of border practices (Filiz, 2009). On the other hand, there is the view as stated by Houtum (1998) that if people do not perceive state borders as barriers, they can develop better relationships (in Topaloglou and Petrakos, 2008). Economic relations between Greece and Turkey have undoubtedly been affected by the bilateral political problems that create a climate of tension and mutual mistrust for both nations. The negative sentiment inhibits the development of bilateral financial relations (Kazakos and Liargovas, 1997: 67). The European Union puts particular emphasis on cross-border co-operation and fund programs such as Interreg in order to promote this union. Gabbe (2005) argued in favor of the Co-
operation of neighbor regions along a border, covering all parts in all areas of the people’s daily life (in Madeiros, 2010).

4.2 Economic relations between Greece and Turkey

Turkey compared to Greece is almost seven times larger in area and population. Specifically, Greece’s size is 131,957 sq.km and its population is 10,964,020 and the area of Turkey is 780,580 sq.km and its population is 71,517,100\(^{17}\) (See Appendix I). Relations between Greece and Turkey improved in 1999 when Greece voted for Turkey’s accession to the European Union at the Helsinki Summit and after the earthquakes that occurred in both countries, one supported the other. Thus, a climate of friendship and trust begins to develop between our two countries, which resulted in bilateral agreements. These agreements are related to tourism, trade, economy, environment, and many other fields. By February 2000, nine agreements were signed between Turkey and Greece. Others followed soon, totaling seventeen bilateral agreements (Anastasiou, 2009). In general terms, the economic co-operation between the two countries is low, with the exception of the tourist sector. As regards to infrastructure, the railway linking the two countries should be improved to be competitive in order to facilitate access for citizens of both countries and tourists.

Lately there has been a strong investor interest from the Turkish side for Greece. State owned Turkish bank, Ziraat Bankasi, opened two branches in Athens and Komotini in February 2009. This is one of the oldest Turkish banks. Also, one of the largest conglomerates in the market of home appliances and furniture with the presence in 58 European countries and in America Istikbal opened a shop. There are Istikbal shops in Xanthi, Kavalla, Komotini and Thessaloniki. Famous restaurants of Turkey like Tike have opened stores in Athens and one of the largest pastry chains of our neighboring country, Karakoy Gulluoglu, already has two outlets in Athens. Even clothing and footwear companies like Ipekyol, Koton, Erak, Inci Shoes and Gizia have stores in Maroussi, Kifissia, Glyfada and Kolonaki\(^{18}\).

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One issue that is important for both countries is the issue of the visa, which is necessary for Turkish citizens who want to move to Greece but because of registration problems, it is hindering the tourism sector. The abolition of the visa would facilitate access for tourists and would benefit both sides as regards the tourist industry. Visas are the number one problem because Schengen makes it difficult for multiple entrances. According to Stavros Daliakas, special assistant to the Deputy Minister of Tourism of Greece, George Nikitiadis the solution is to improve the process to get a Schengen visa at the Greek consulate. The movement [by boat] does not require a visa, but if someone gets off, then the law requires a visa, although Greek officials on the islands are turning a blind eye”.

Recent years have seen an increase of tourists in Turkey. The reasons for traveling are leisure, sports or cultural activities.

![Figure 4.1: Individual tour expenditures of foreigners by types of purpose of visit (2010)](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of Visit</th>
<th>Expenditures (2010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Travel, entertainment, sportive or cultural activities</td>
<td>$6,828,308.984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting relatives and friends</td>
<td>$2,323,374.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health reasons</td>
<td>$1,103,036.493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>$625,036.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping</td>
<td>$625,036.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transit</td>
<td>$625,036.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>$625,036.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/conferences, meetings, assignments etc.)</td>
<td>$625,036.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$625,036.036</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for Greeks visiting Turkey, a decrease in the last three years has been registered. Greeks choose Turkey for entertainment, business or to meet friends and relatives.

It is observed that the money that Greek tourists spend when in Turkey has decreased significantly, especially in the last three years (source: Turkstat).

Regarding the financial sector in the field of imports-exports, exports of Turkey to Greece compared to 2010 have decreased while imports have increased.
Figure 4.4: Foreign trade by partner country (Greece) for all provinces

![Foreign trade by partner country (Greece) for all provinces](image)

source: Turkstat/own elaboration.
CHAPTER 5

Cross Border Co-operation between Greece and Turkey

5.1 A short introduction

The border areas co-operating between Greece and Turkey were selected by the European Union. For Greece, the accessible areas are Evros, Samos, Lesbos and Chios. On the other hand, Turkey has Edirne, Canakkale, Balikesir, Izmir, Aydin and Mugla. In general terms, the economic co-operation between the two countries is low, with the exception of the tourism sector. All these figures come from the Statistical Office of Turkey. As regards to the visit of Turks to the border regions of Greece data is inconclusive.

5.2 Interreg

As mentioned in a previous chapter, the Community Initiative interreg aims to promote cross-border, transnational and interregional co-operation in the European Union and it was funded by the European Regional Development Fund. It was designed to enhance the economic and social cohesion throughout the European Union and its emphasis on integrating remote regions and regions bordering the candidate countries. The interreg between Greece and Turkey concerning the programming period 2004-2006 was approved by the European Commission on 22/12/2003. The total program budget was 66,018,843 € of which 46,664,004 € went to the Greek Program interreg III A and 15,000,000 € to the Financial Instrument for Turkey. The overall strategic objective of the Program was to promote the core region to consolidate peace and development process in the Eastern Balkan Peninsula and the Aegean Sea.

The operational objective of the Program would have been as follows: The upgrade of the border region in terms of infrastructure and the development of cross-border co-operation in all socioeconomic sectors. The specific objectives, which will materialize the strategy and will lead to the achievement of operational objectives, are as follows:

- Improvement of accessibility and communication.
- Strengthening economic activity and encouraging initiatives for addressing unemployment.
Upgrading of the quality of life of citizens, improvement of environmental management and enhancement of cultural resources (Source: http://www.interreg.gr).

But the plan did not materialize eventually, and with no official response as to why this happened. During 2004 the program showed very limited progress due to the high level of bureaucracy, very complex project reporting process and use of two different funding sources. Significantly, projects had to be designed from both sides, to be implemented on both sides of the border and to benefit the population of both sides of the border (Filiz, 2009).

Also, the Greece-Turkey Cross-Border Co-operation Program 2007-2013 has not been activated "for political reasons". In particular, in the Greece-Turkey Cross-Border Co-operation Program 2007-2013, the border region of Thrace, with regards to the land Greek-Turkish borders was excluded from the program and only the areas of the North and South Aegean were participating, with a budget of € 34,088,992. Although interreg IV is in force from 2007 until 2013, there was no progress of realization of the program even from the participating regions of the Greek islands with the coastal Turkish areas. The official site of the Greek ministry of Economy and Finance mentions that the actual program "has been suspended" (Chrisdoulaki 2010).

5.3 Turkey’s border area

The population in border areas in 2010 ranged from 694,926 residents in Balikesir up to 3,606,326 in Izmir, which is the third largest city in Turkey (Source: Turkstat). The border areas of Turkey are Aydin, Balikesir, Mugla, Cannakale, Edirne and Izmir.
Figure 5.1: Population of province/district centers/towns/villages by provinces of Turkey 2010

Source: Turkstat/own elaboration

Figure 5.2: Births by place

Source: Turkstat/own elaboration
5.3.1 Aydin

Aydin is located very close to the island of Samos and most Greeks choose to be transported by ship to the port area, of Kusadasi. We note that in recent years, Greek tourists have increased in the region (See Appendix III).

*Figure 5.3: Greek visitors to Aydin*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Aydin, Kuşadası Seaway</th>
<th>Aydin, Kuşadası Excursion</th>
<th>Aydin, Söke Seaway</th>
<th>Aydin, Didim Seaway</th>
<th>Aydin, Didim yat limanı Seaway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.190</td>
<td>16.063</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.594</td>
<td>20.914</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.803</td>
<td>28.143</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.318</td>
<td>19.927</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.714</td>
<td>13.449</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: Turkstat/own elaboration
5.3.2 Balikesir

As regards to the area of Balikesir, a significant drop in traffic of Greek tourists in the region has been noticed. It has been noted that since 2006 there has been a significant reduction in the number of tourists visiting Balikesir, except for 2009 where there was a significant rise (See Appendix IV).

*Figure 5.4: Greek visitors to Balikesir*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balıkesir,Bandırma Seaway</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: Turkstat/own elaboration
5.3.3 Canakkale

Canakkale is located near the islands of Samothrace and Lemnos, nevertheless the majority of Greek tourists are transported by car and by boat (See Appendix V). This data suggests that Canakkale is not considered as an attractive destination for Greek tourists.

Figure 5.5: Greek: Greek visitors to Canakkale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Canakkale, Center: Seaway</th>
<th>Canakkale, Center: Excursion</th>
<th>Canakkale, Kepez: Seaway</th>
<th>Canakkale, Kepez: Excursion</th>
<th>Canakkale, Center: Airway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1.233</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: Turkstat/own elaboration
5.3.4 Edirne

Edirne or otherwise Adrianople is very close to the Turkish border making it easily accessible and thus an increase of Greek tourists has been noted over the years (See Appendix VI).

*Figure 5.6: Greek visitors to Edirne*

![Bar chart showing the number of visitors to Edirne from 2006 to 2010 via different routes. The chart includes data for Hamzabeyli:Roadway, Pazarkule:Roadway, Kapıkule:Roadway, Ipsala:Roadway, Uzunköprü:Railway, and Kapıkule:Railway. The data is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>126.287</td>
<td>4.157</td>
<td>336.033</td>
<td>3.710</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>111.501</td>
<td>3.137</td>
<td>292.785</td>
<td>5.626</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>84.150</td>
<td>2.510</td>
<td>277.135</td>
<td>6.686</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>64.895</td>
<td>2.279</td>
<td>208.607</td>
<td>7.058</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>70.280</td>
<td>2.166</td>
<td>182.131</td>
<td>6.847</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkstat/own elaboration
5.3.5 Mugla

The Mugla region near the island of Kos is in the near most accessible point of the region, the port of Marmaris (See Appendix VII). From 2008 onwards there has been a significant reduction of Greek tourists visiting the area.

*Figure 5.7: Greek visitors to Mugla*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Seaway Bozburan</th>
<th>Seaway Marmaris</th>
<th>Excursion Marmaris</th>
<th>Seaway Turgutreis</th>
<th>Excursion Turgutreis</th>
<th>Seaway Yalıkavak</th>
<th>Excursion Yalıkavak</th>
<th>Seaway Mantarburnu</th>
<th>Excursion Mantarburnu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4.822</td>
<td>6.965</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>1.258</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.972</td>
<td>1.056</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5.688</td>
<td>6.631</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>1.185</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>199</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8.211</td>
<td>8.398</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>1.087</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>218</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4.256</td>
<td>3.663</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3.669</td>
<td>3.462</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>1.150</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: Turkstat/own elaboration
5.3.6 Izmir

The Turkish tour guide calls Izmir «the pearl of Turkey». Izmir, historically Smyrna, is the third most heavily populated city of Turkey and the country's largest port after Istanbul. It is located in the Gulf of Izmir, by the Aegean Sea. The city of Izmir is comprised by 9 metropolitan districts, Balçova, Bornova, Buca, Çiğli, Gaziemir, Güzelbahçe, Karşıyaka, Konak, and Narlıdere.

Each district, and generally the neighborhoods within it, possess distinct features and a particular temperament. The population of this urban zone is around 3, 5 million. Most Greeks visiting Izmir are transported by ship to the port of Cesme (See Appendix VIII).

Figure 5.8: Greek visitors to Izmir

source: Turkstat/own elaboration

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5.3.7 Conclusion

Relations between Greece and Turkey have been tense for long periods of time, but there have also been periods of "tranquillity." All this negative sentiment and the political situation of the two countries affected the mobility of tourists from one country to another. Although there are distinct differences between the two countries as regards to the cultural level, the language and religion, however there is room for co-operation in the development of tourism. Also, the lack and/ or failure to record data from both sides is a deterrent concerning the observation of areas in which co-operation does exist.

At the Greek-Turkish border region there is "mobility" as regards the tourism sector. Moreover, the interest of many Greek regions are evident on the Turkish side, concluding agreements at local or regional level institutional bodies such as municipalities and communities to develop growth and co-operation between the two countries. The CBC, however, is a tool for achieving the border delay because they were "artificial" separations of larger countries financially (Kazakos and Liargovas, 1997:60). The co-operation of two countries, both nationally and across borders can only benefit both sides.
CHAPTER 6

Conclusions

Despite all the difficulties in finding data and the lack of literature, this dissertation has attempted to approach the issue of cross-border co-operation between Greece and Turkey. First of all there is literature review concerning the borders in terms of economy but also of concepts based in contemporary literature regarding the borders. Furthermore there is a brief analysis of the financial and political situation of Turkey and its relations with the European Union and its member states. Also, there is a brief reference to the Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue. There is particular emphasis on the cross-border relationship between Greece and Turkey both at national level and regional areas that compose it.

The amount of cross-border co-operation between the two countries in various fields is difficult to find and identify quantitatively because there is a lack of relative statistical data or data outside the field of tourism. The co-operation of the two countries is still at an early stage, but the encouragement of local authorities and residents of border areas may be developed further in the future. For this reason they need more initiatives at both national and local level to solve problems that are common such as immigration or the strengthening of some collaborations, for example in the tourism industry which would beneficial for both parties.

The question is whether the cross-border regional co-operation needs or requires obtaining the existence of strong local-regional co-operation institutions. The answer depends on the conditions under which co-operation of this type is promoted. Especially at the European level, it is specially given emphasis to promote closer co-operation between member states and without the institutional framework of the European Union in various fields like this it is done by creating regulations and homogeneous rules to achieve or facilitate the maximum achievement of goals.

Borders have a significant impact on people’s perceptions and affect the relations between countries. Regarding Turkey's accession to the European Union, no one can answer if Turkey will become a full member because it must resolve outstanding issues such as internal problems and the Cyprus issue.
Relations between Greece and Turkey are characterized by tensions, conflicts and rarely periods of peace. All these affect the relations between them and naturally their cross-border co-operation. Nevertheless, in these recent years, collaborations have been created between the two countries, with particular emphasis on tourism and business. Greece is a tourist destination and Turkey is now a major tourist attraction, both at a European and global level. For this reason, both sides should give particular attention, especially to the border area of the Aegean in order to benefit from future profits. Another field of collaboration is the part of the environment, setting common goals and joint actions to protect it.

Both countries need to find a "common" code of communication to ensure peace and security between them and realize that the "points" that separate them are those which unite them. In areas where there is a cultural homogeny a typical example of co-operation among local authorities is primarily developed (Kazakos & Liargovas, 1997: 60). The problems arise when countries do not have this "cultural community" and need institutions and bodies to contribute to the development of border policy. Examples of countries that face a shortage of "cultural and economic homogeneity" are Greece and Turkey and for this reason, any co-operation between these countries is *a priori* difficult. Greece and Turkey have a long history and a background of conflict that exists till today, and for this reason their relationship is an attraction for many analysts who study and observe the progress and development of relations between these two countries in all fields.
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APPENDIX I

Maps of Greece and Turkey

Map of Turkey

source: www.geology.com

Map of Greece

source: www.greek-islands.us
Regions of Turkey

source: http:printable-maps.blogspot.com

APPENDIX II

Border areas population

Turkey: Population of border areas (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aydın</td>
<td>495,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balıkesir</td>
<td>578,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Çanakkale</td>
<td>254,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edirne</td>
<td>196,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İzmir</td>
<td>1,985,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muğla</td>
<td>416,029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: Turkstat/own elaboration
Turkey: Population of border areas by sex (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aydın</td>
<td>495,363</td>
<td>494,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balıkesir</td>
<td>578,663</td>
<td>573,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Çanakkale</td>
<td>254,579</td>
<td>235,818</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edirne</td>
<td>196,262</td>
<td>194,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İzmir</td>
<td>1,985,368</td>
<td>1,963,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muğla</td>
<td>416,029</td>
<td>401,474</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: Turkstat/own elaboration

APPENDIX III

Map and demographic profile of Aydin

source: www.mapzones.com
Births by statistical regions of Europe (Level 3) and sex. Place of birth: Aydin

source: Turkstat/own elaboration

APPENDIX IV

Map and demographic profile of Balikesir

source: www.mapzones.com
Births by statistical regions of Europe (Level 3) and sex. Place of birth: Balikesir

source: Turkstat/own elaboration

APPENDIX V

Map and demographic profile of Canakkale

source: http://www.uyduharita.org/canakkale-haritasi/78-canakkale-bogazi-haritasi/
Births by statistical regions of Europe (Level 3) and sex. Place of birth: Canakkale

source: Turkstat/own elaboration

APPENDIX VI

Map and demographic profile of Edirne

source: www.mapzones.com
Births by statistical regions of Europe (Level 3) and sex. Place of birth: Edirne

source: Turkstat/own elaboration

Edirne area

source: www.trainsofturkey.com
APPENDIX VII

Map and demographic profile of Mugla

source: www.mapzones.com

Births by statistical regions of Europe (Level 3) and sex. Place of birth: Mugla

source: Turkstat/own elaboration
APPENDIX VIII

Map and demographic profile of Izmir

source: izmirde.biz

Births by statistical regions of Europe (Level 3) and sex: Place of birth: Izmir

source: Turkstat/own elaboration

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