Recovery mechanisms in a joint energy/reserve day-ahead electricity market with non-convexities
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the incentive compatibility of several cost- and bid-based recovery mechanisms that may be implemented in a wholesale electricity market to make the generation units whole in the presence of non-convexities, which are due to unit commitment costs and capacity constraints. To this end, we simulate the bidding behavior of the participants in a simplified model of the Greek joint energy/reserve day-ahead electricity market, where we assume that the players (units) participate as potential price-makers in a non-cooperative game with complete information that is repeated for many rounds. The results suggest that a mechanism based on bid recovery with a regulated cap is quite promising. © 2010 IEEE.
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
Gkatzikis, L.; Salonidis, T.; Hegde, N.; Massoulie, L. (2012)Demand response (DR) programs motivate home users through dynamic pricing to shift electricity consumption from peak demand periods. In this paper, we introduce a day ahead electricity market where the operator sets the ...
Andrianesis, P.; Liberopoulos, G.; Biskas, P. (2010)The EU Emissions Trading Scheme, Europe's main mechanism for implementing EU climate policy, is driving thermal electricity generation units to incorporate their emissions cost into their variable costs. In this paper, we ...
Andrianesis, P. E.; Liberopoulos, G.; Papalexopoulos, A. D. (2012)The Greek wholesale electricity market is based on a day-ahead unit commitment market clearing and generation dispatch formulation with co-optimization of energy and reserves without the participation of transmission. An ...